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a b s t r a c t
The 20th century has witnessed wholesale transformation in the energy system marked by the
pervasive diffusion of both energy supply and end-use technologies. Just as whole industries have
grown, so too have unit sizes or capacities. Analysed in combination, these unit level and industry level
growth patterns reveal some consistencies across very different energy technologies. First, the up-
scaling or increase in unit size of an energy technology comes after an often prolonged period of
experimentation with many smaller-scale units. Second, the peak growth phase of an industry can lag
these increases in unit size by up to 20 years. Third, the rate and timing of up-scaling at the unit level is
subject to countervailing influences of scale economies and heterogeneous market demand. These
observed patterns have important implications for experience curve analyses based on time series data
covering the up-scaling phases of energy technologies, as these are likely to conflate industry level
learning effects with unit level scale effects. The historical diffusion of energy technologies also
suggests that low carbon technology policies pushing for significant jumps in unit size before a
‘formative phase’ of experimentation with smaller-scale units are risky.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Energy systems have witnessed transformative growth over
the last 100 years. Global primary energy consumption increased
16-fold in the 20th century, as did GDP, compared to a 4-fold
increase in population (Smil, 2000). Nested within this centennial
trend are periods of rapid and pervasive technological diffusion.
In the 1960s, roughly one coal-fired steam turbine unit averaging
125 MW in capacity was installed every other day, and around
3 in 4 of these were in OECD countries alone. In the 1990s, Boeing
and Airbus’ combined production was about three commercial jet
aircraft every other day carrying the equivalent of around
150 MW of power plant. The ever-expanding capacity of the
energy system to convert primary energy into energy carriers
into useful services (and on into human welfare) is the result of
increasing numbers of energy technologies, but also increasing
sizes: more coal power plants and jet aircraft; larger capacity coal
power plants and jet aircraft.
Technological change in the energy system is typically char-
acterised at the industry level. As a current example, frequent
reference is made to the double digit growth rates of the wind or
solar photovoltaic industries (IEA, 2008). This industry level growth
is characterised by falling units costs associated with increasing
experience, a relationship described by learning phenomena.
Alongside learning, scaling is another widespread character-
istics of technological diffusion in the energy system. Many
energy technologies have increased in size and energy conversion
capacity over the past 100 years (see Smil (2008) for many
examples and graphics). In the early 20th century, the first mass
produced car, Ransom Old’s Curved Dash, carried around 10
horsepower, and the model-T Ford double that. Over the next
50 years, this increased seven-fold: by 1975, the average new
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vehicle in the US packed close to 140 horsepower. More com-
monly associated with energy supply technologies, a salient
current example of ‘up-scaling’ is the steady march of wind
turbine rated capacities and tower heights from the tens of
kilowatts with 20–30 m towers in the early 1980s up to
2–5 MW with hub heights well over 100 m today. The urgency
of decarbonisation objectives mean near-term policy and engi-
neering expectations are for rapid up-scaling or increases in the
capacities of other low carbon technologies including carbon
capture and storage (Haszeldine, 2009) and concentrating solar
power (Shinnar and Citro, 2008).
By capturing available scale economies, up-scaling can also
lead to reductions in average unit costs. If these are concurrent
with increasing production, then scale effects at the unit level
may be conflated with learning effects at the industry level. So:
what role does the up-scaling of energy technologies play in
industry level growth? And by extension, how likely are the
potential confounding effects of up-scaling on cost reductions
attributed to learning from cumulative experience?
To address these questions, we investigate how rapidly and
how pervasively energy technologies have diffused historically,
distinguishing the timing of different phases within this overall
diffusion process and the ‘up-scaling’ phase in particular. We also
assess the factors that have enabled (or constrained) up-scaling at
the unit level within the overall industry level growth. We find
consistent evidence for a sequence of formative, up-scaling, and
growth phases in our sample of energy technologies, and a trade-
off between unit scale economies and heterogeneous market
demand in determining the rate and timing of up-scaling. We
conclude that up-scaling is likely to be conflated with learning
effects in particular for centralised energy supply technologies.
We also draw some general implications for technology policy.
2. Energy technology diffusion: learning and up-scaling
2.1. The lifecycle and diffusion of energy technologies
The pattern of diffusion over time for energy technologies has
been characterised by logistic substitution models (Marchetti and
Nakicenovic, 1979). Logistic growth describes an initial period of
gradual diffusion as a technology is introduced as a new com-
mercial application, moving then through a rapid, exponential
growth phase, before slowing and eventually saturating (Grubler
et al., 1999). The substitution of incumbent technologies by
new competitors leads to subsequent decline and eventual
obsolescence.
Early on in their lifecycle, new technologies are crude, imper-
fect, and expensive (Rosenberg, 1994). New energy technologies
are attractive for their ability to perform a particular task or
deliver a new or improved energy service (Fouquet, 2010). This is
often circumscribed by a particular set of needs in a particular
context: a market ‘niche’. End-users in niche markets are gen-
erally less sensitive to the effective price of the energy service
provided or have a higher willingness to pay for its performance
advantages (Fouquet, 2010). Thus initially, performance domi-
nates cost competitiveness (Wilson and Grubler, 2011). Market
niches afford some protection from competitive pressures, allow-
ing technologies to be tested and improved in applied settings,
reducing uncertainties with performance or market demand
(Kemp et al., 1998). Costs may only fall substantively after an
extended period of commercial experimentation, concurrent with
the establishment of an industrial base and characteristic moves
towards standardisation and mass production (Grubler, 1998).
The influence of accumulating production experience on costs is
captured by the concept of learning.
2.2. Learning, and experience curves
Learning is a descriptive label for a multi-faceted process of
knowledge generation, application and exchange. Learning may
lead to product design improvements, material efficiencies, labour
productivity, process refinements, lower contingencies or conser-
vatism as perceived risks are reduced, better system integration,
and so on (Argote and Epple, 1990). Originally associated with the
experience of ‘doing’ (Arrow, 1962), learning effects have also been
attributed to using, operating, implementing, copying, searching
and building (Sagar and van der Zwaan, 2006).
Cost reductions associated with learning processes are
described by industry-level experience curves which express unit
costs as a function of cumulative production experience (Yeh and
Rubin, 2012).1 The learning rate measures the cost reduction for
each successive doubling of cumulative production. Historical
learning rates have been extensively characterised for energy
technologies. Weiss et al., 2010a compiled data on over 200
learning rates for both energy supply and energy end-use tech-
nologies, finding means of 1679% and 1879% respectively.
Expectations of future learning rates, particularly for low
carbon energy technologies, are widely used to inform or ratio-
nalise technology policies (Wene, 2000; Nemet, 2009) and to
model the diffusion of technologies under different scenario
assumptions (Clarke et al., 2008). Although preferable to fore-
casting either constant costs or declining costs over time (Alberth,
2008), the use of prospective learning rates is contentious.
First, learning rates even for the same technologies are subject
to considerable uncertainties (Weiss et al., 2010a). Both data and
learning processes are sensitive to the context of analysis, includ-
ing the temporal and geographic system boundaries (Nemet, 2009)
and other social and political factors (Yeh and Rubin, 2012). The
price of production inputs, as well as profit margins (if price is used
in lieu of cost as the performance measure) may change over time
(Ferioli et al., 2009). Changes in product designs and the qualitative
characteristics of the energy service provided need to be accounted
for in standardising the cumulative production data (Coulomb and
Neuhoff, 2006; Weiss et al., 2010b).
Second, learning is not a deterministic outcome of increasing
production, but rather is contingent on a host of firm and
industry-level innovation processes and efforts (Grubler, 2010).
Two-factor experience curves, for example, explicitly represent
the influence of cumulative R&D expenditure and the resulting
R&D-based knowledge stock on unit cost reductions (So¨derholm
and Klaassen, 2007; Ek and Soderholm, 2010). But other omitted
variables may still introduce biases. Examples include autono-
mous technological improvement, input price volatility, and
knowledge spillovers (Nemet, 2006; Nordhaus, 2009).
Scale effects at the industry level realised through manufac-
turing and other scale economies are recognised as important
drivers of the cost reductions described by experience curves
(Argote and Epple, 1990). In their early synthesis, Dutton and
Thomas (1984) find that ‘‘sometimes much of what is attributed
to experience is due to scale’’. In the case of solar photovoltaic
modules in the US, manufacturing scale economies explained 43%
of observed cost reductions ($/Wpeak) between 1980 and 2001
(Nemet, 2006). Qiu and Anadon (2012) found economies of scale
at the wind farm level in China explained roughly twice as much
of the observed cost reductions as learning-by-doing, though the
effects of both were dwarfed by the domestication of wind
turbine manufacturing to exploit lower labour and material costs.
Differing potentials for manufacturing scale economies in the
1 Learning curves are a similar concept but apply to specific manufacturing
plants or processes and focus on labour productivity (Dutton and Thomas, 1984).
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component supply chains and assembly plants of cold versus wet
household appliances was one factor that helped explain differ-
ences in observed learning rates (Weiss et al., 2010a).
The emphasis of this paper, however, is on up-scaling at the
unit level and its potential conflation with industry level pro-
cesses in explaining observed reductions in the unit costs of
energy technologies.
2.3. Up-scaling
‘Scaling up’ or ‘up-scaling’ are terms used to describe the
increase in size or performance capacity of a technology (Luiten
and Blok, 2003). Economies of scale associated with up-scaling
also lead to reductions in average unit costs.2 Wind turbines are a
useful example. The power output of a turbine is proportional to
the swept area of its blades, so a doubling of rotor diameter
quadruples power output (Burton et al., 2001). Longer blades
need taller towers, so scale economies are further improved by
the stronger and more laminar wind speeds further from the
ground. But capturing returns to scale is not without trade-offs.
Longer blades are also heavier (notwithstanding design and
materials innovations), imposing additional stresses on the gen-
erating equipment and other nascelle components (Coulomb and
Neuhoff, 2006). Ultimately, this defines a unit scale frontier above
which diseconomies of scale impose additional costs.3
Nelson and Winter (1977) argued that up-scaling was routed
in the natural development trajectories of technologies. Using the
DC3 aircraft in the 1930s as an example, they argue: ‘‘Engineers
had some strong notions regarding the potential of [metal skin,
low wing, piston powered planes]. For more than two decades
innovation in aircraft design essentially involved better exploita-
tion of this potential; improving the engines, enlargening the
planes, making them more efficient’’ (our italics, Nelson and
Winter, 1977, p. 57). Indeed, the progressive exploitation of scale
economies is one of two features common to a wide range of
technologies’ trajectories (the other is mechanisation).
Winter (2008) argues that for many types of durable equip-
ment, scaling is a powerful heuristic or ‘‘constant background
condition’’ of production. Drawing on the concept of technological
paradigms which guide the design process (Dosi, 1982), up-
scaling can be seen as an embedded part of the process of normal
engineering. Seeking ways to exploit the potential for up-scaling
is how technologists, designers and engineers think.
Frenken and Leydesdorff (2000) found that up-scaling occurs
during a period in the technology lifecycle when a radical innova-
tion becomes embedded as the dominant design. Proposed origin-
ally by Abernathy and Utterback (1978), a dominant design is one
which appeals to a wide number of users (beyond particular
niches), and settles core design concepts in both components and
their integration in a complex assembled product (Murmann and
Frenken, 2006). This leads competitors to imitate and production to
move from bespoke to standardised manufacturing. Whereas a
radical innovation may introduce a wholly new set of trade-offs
between a product’s technical and service attributes, subsequent
incremental innovations holds this trade-off constant while vary-
ing scale so as to adapt the dominant design to particular market
segments (Frenken and Leydesdorff, 2000). The scaling heuristic
does not always imply up-scaling. In the case of mobile phones,
scaling trajectories balance demands for longer battery lives and
increased functionality with the ergonomic need for handsets of
appropriate weight and size (Windrum et al., 2009).
Developed originally by Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984), this
conceptualisation of the relationship between technical and service
characteristics as a way of mapping technological trajectories has
been applied to a range of energy technologies. In the case of
propeller aircraft, up-scaling to increase take-off weight left unal-
tered the basic relationships between technical characteristics such
as wing loading, and performance or service characteristics such as
speed and passenger capacity. Up-scaling was thus part of a
service-oriented adaptation of the dominant design (Sahal, 1985).
Similar patterns have been found in the technological evolution of
tractors and computers (Sahal, 1985), helicopters (Saviotti and
Trickett, 1992), and tanks (Castaldi et al., 2009).
In sum, up-scaling to capture unit scale economies is therefore
driven by the potential for cost reductions but constrained by the
market demand for larger scale technologies, and by engineering
and design limits. Sahal (1985) argued that overcoming the
structural constraints to up-scaling to produce designs of differ-
ent scales was a major spur for innovation and learning processes.
2.4. Conflation of learning effects and up-scaling
Isolating the relative contribution of unit level up-scaling and
industry level learning processes to cost reductions over time
requires econometric or bottom-up engineering models that
disaggregate and control for concurrent influences. These are
the exception rather than the rule in conventional experience
curve analyses (Weiss et al., 2010a).
Examples of these exceptions include two studies of coal power
plants built in the US from 1960 to 1980. Joskow and Rose (1985)
found that a doubling of unit scale (in MW terms) reduced the cost
per unit capacity by 12%, controlling for learning effects as well as
compliance with environmental regulation and changes in produc-
tivity and input prices. McCabe (1996) extended the analysis to
include steam turbine units in nuclear power plants from 1967 to
1988 and similarly found unit scale economies to be significant,
controlling for other factors. In the case of coal power, a doubling of
unit capacity reduced unit costs by 20–24%, and in the case of
nuclear power by 15–19% (although with higher uncertainty)
(McCabe, 1996). It is worth noting that the time period over which
these models were fitted describes the period of rapid up-scaling
during which unit scale economies might be expected to be most
evident. In contrast, McNerney et al. (2011) use a decomposition
model of the cost of coal-fired electricity generation in the US over
the long-run from 1902 to 1970. They find that reductions in
capital costs ($/MW) associated with scale economies explained
12% of the observed cost decline, compared with 55% attributed to
improved plant efficiency and 26% to higher capacity factors
(McNerney et al., 2011).
Coulomb and Neuhoff (2006) distinguish learning effects from
component-specific scale effects in an engineering-based decom-
position study of the price of wind turbines in Germany from 1991
to 2003. The learning rate increased from 11% to 13% after
controlling for unit scale effects, pointing to diseconomies of scale
associated with up-scaling (Coulomb and Neuhoff, 2006). Ek and
Soderholm (2010) similarly find that up-scaling in wind turbines
results in cost increases, although not significantly so, after con-
trolling for learning effects and R&D expenditures. Again, this
multi-factor approach is the exception rather than the rule. In a
meta-analysis of 113 learning rates estimated for onshore wind
power by 35 studies, Lindman and Soderholm (2012) found only
14% controlled for unit scale effects. Whereas the inclusion of
2 For analysis of the benefits and challenges of up-scaling energy technologies:
in the case of nuclear power, see Grubler (2010); for centralised electricity
generation plant, see Victor (2002); for cars, see Raff (1991); for wind power, see
Heymann (1998).
3 Although up-scaling is associated with unit scale diseconomies for turbines
above 0.4–0.5 MW, the optimal turbine size for project developers is much larger
as the fixed cost of balance of plant components including the grid interconnect
can be spread over a larger capacity (i.e., plant or windfarm scale economies)
(Coulomb and Neuhoff, 2006).
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knowledge spillovers, turbine-specific costs, and public R&D
expenditures had a statistically significant effect on estimated
learning rates, up-scaling did not (Lindman and Soderholm, 2012).
3. Method
3.1. Aims of study
This study aims to: (i) assess the importance of up-scaling or
unit level growth in energy technologies; (ii) characterise the
timing of up-scaling relative to industry level learning processes;
and (iii) evaluate the potential for conflating learning effects and
unit level scale economies on observed or expected cost reduc-
tions. The analysis therefore focuses on the distinction between
unit level growth (‘up-scaling’) and industry level growth (cumu-
lative production) for a range of different energy technologies.
3.2. Data
To ensure the generalisability of findings, we sampled from a
range of energy technologies, including both centralised, capital
intensive energy supply technologies as well as distributed, low cost
technologies directly providing useful services to end users. For
energy supply technologies, we selected refineries, large scale power
plants (coal, natural gas, nuclear), and small to medium scale power
plants (wind, solar PV or photovoltaic). For end-use technologies, we
selected jet aircraft, helicopters, cars, compact fluorescent light bulbs
(CFLs), and mobile phones. In each case, technologies were selected
based on their significant role or contribution to the accumulation of
energy conversion capacity within the energy system.
The time series data compiled are summarised in Table 1, with
technologies ordered from high to low unit capacity. Data for
energy supply technologies mainly describe installation and use;
data for end-use technologies mainly describe production or sales.
From this sample, we were unable to use data on solar PV,
helicopters, and mobile phones, due to their relative youth in
technology lifecycle terms, data limitations, or difficulties of con-
structing meaningful energy-related metrics. Our final sample of
energy technologies therefore had five energy supply and three
energy end-use technologies. The small size of the sample means
findings are illustrative only.
To account for the spatial diffusion of technologies from their
initial market of first commercial application (‘core’) through to
subsequent (‘rim’) and then final markets (‘periphery’), we dis-
aggregated global data into regions defined for each technology
Table 1
Technology diffusion time series data.Notes: Of the eleven technologies shown, eight were include in the final analysis. Solar PV, helicopters and mobile phones were
excluded. See text for details.
Technology Data & units Time series Notes Main sourcesa
Unit level capacity Unit numbers Industry level
capacity
Supply-side technologies
Oil refineries Total capacity (bpd) 1940–2000 (average only) Not available 1940–2007 Industry level—installed not
cumulative capacity
Oil & Gas Journal,
BP, Enos
Unit level—US only (fluid
catalytic cracking units)
Power—coal Capacity additions
(#, MW)
1908–2000 (max. & average) 1908–2000 1908–2000 Industry level—cumulative
capacity (includes all
substituted/retired
capacity).
Platts
Power—nuclear Capacity additions
(#, MW)
1956–2000 (max. & average) 1956–2000 1956–2000 Platts
Power—natural gas Capacity additions
(#, MW)
1903–2000 (max. & average) 1903–2000 1903–2000 Platts
Power—wind Capacity additions
(#, MW)
1977–2008 (average only) 1977–2008 1977–2008 DEA, BTM Consult
Power—solar
photovoltaic (PV)
Cumulative
capacity (MW)
Not available Not available 1975–2007 Maycock, EPIA
End use technologies
Passenger Jet Aircraft Aircraft delivered
(#, model) & engine
thrust (kN)
1958–2007 (max. & average) 1958–2007 1958–2007 Boeing, McDonnell–
Douglas, Airbus onlyb
Jane’s, aircraft
databases
Helicopters Helicopters
introduced (model)
1940–1986 Not available Not available Unit level—different
measures of capacity
Saviotti & Trickett
Passenger cars Cars produced (#) &
engine capacity (hp)
1910–1960, 1960–2005 1900–2005 Calculated from
unit data
Unit level—US only to 1960;
numbers from all motor
vehicle data
AAMA, US NHTSA,
ACEA
Compact fluorescent
light bulbs (CFLs)
Light bulb sales (#) Estimated 1990–2003 Estimated from
unit data
Unit level—capacity
assumed constant
IEA
Mobile phones Mobile Phone
Subscribers (#)
Not available 1982–2008 Not available Unit level—capacity data
not meaningful for service
provision
OECD, ITU
a Main sources described in detail in Wilson (2009): Refineries—OGJ (1999, 2000), Enos (2002) and BP (2008); Coal, nuclear, natural gas power—Platts (2005); Wind
power—BTM_Consult (2002), Danish_Energy_Agency (2008); Solar photovoltaics—Maycock (2002); Passenger jet aircraft—Jane’s (1998) with supplementary data from
online sources including www.airliners.net, www.flightglobal.com, www.boeing.com, www.airbus.com; Helicopters—Saviotti and Trickett (1992); Passenger Cars—AAMA
(1980, 1995, 1997) with supplementary data from online sources including US National Highways Traffic Safety Agency (www.nhtsa.dot.gov) and European Automobile
Manufacturers’ Association (www.acea.be); Compact fluorescent light bulbs—IEA (2006); Mobile phones—OECD (2007, 2009) with supplementary data from International
Telecommunications Union (www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/index.html).
b We estimate that these three manufacturers have accounted for over 2/3 of total cumulative sales of large commercial jet aircraft (and currently account for over 90%
of annual sales). Historically, the other main manufacturers were from the former Soviet Union (e.g., Tupolev, Ilyushin) but available data are incomplete. See Wilson
(2009) for full discussion.
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by the sequence of spatial diffusion in the data (following Grubler,
1998). Thus, for example, Denmark is the core region for wind
power; the US is the core region for cars; the OECD is the core
region for natural gas power. Further details on the method and
data are provided in Wilson (2009); all data are also freely
available online.4
3.3. Metrics and Definitions
We used energy conversion capacity in MW as a common
metric of both unit and industry level growth. Capacity data are
widely used in experience curve studies as a proxy for production
experience. Capacity measures the energy conversion potential
of different technologies and so what Winter (2008) calls a
‘‘productively-relevant feature’’ to which the scaling heuristic
applies. For all the technologies in our sample, capacity is also
meaningful to the energy service provided: the horsepower of cars
and the thrust of jet engines is related to the mobility service
provided; the wattage of light bulbs is related to the illumination
service provided; and so on.
We expressed unit level growth in terms of: (i) average
capacity (or size) of additional units; (ii) maximum capacity of
additional units; and (iii) unit capacity frontier. We expressed
industry level growth in terms of: (i) cumulative total capacity of
all units and (ii) cumulative total number of all units.
We drew on the concept of an operational principle in defining the
unit level as a technological system purchasable by final consumers
in order to provide a useful service (Murmann and Frenken, 2006). In
the case of aircraft, for example, we selected as units the jet engine
rather than the turbine (which is a component or sub-system) or the
aircraft itself (which is a hierarchy of systems).
As examples of the unit level data analysed, the top two panels
of Fig. 1 show the maximum and average capacities of steam
Fig. 1. Unit level growth (upper panels) and industry level growth (lower panels) in natural gas power (left panels) and jet aircraft (right panels) globally.
Data: see Table 1 for details.
4 Please cite this paper if using the data or graphics made available online at:
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/TNT/WEB/Publications/Scaling_Dynamics_of_Energy_
Technologies/.
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turbine units installed in natural gas-fired power plants since
1903, and the engine capacity of Boeing jet aircraft since 1958
(see Table 1 for details of data and sources). These two technol-
ogies are inter-related by the application of aeroengines in the
power sector for use as gas turbines in a combined cycle
configuration with conventional steam turbines (Lee, 1987).
As examples of the industry level data analysed, the lower two
panels of Fig. 1 show the corresponding growth of cumulative
total unit numbers (left-hand y-axis) and cumulative total capa-
city (right-hand side y-axis) for natural gas-fired power plants
and jet aircraft over their respective lifecycles.
3.4. Growth functions
We used logistic growth functions to describe the time series
data subject to criteria of accuracy (minimum R2¼95%) and
reliability (minimum % of estimated asymptote reached by
data¼60%).5 Growth function parameters then allowed inter-
technology comparisons over the whole period of diffusion from
initial commercialisation to saturation. Three parameters in
particular were of interest:
# K¼the saturation level or asymptote, used as a measure of the
extent of growth;
# Dt (delta t)¼the time period taken to grow from 10% to 90% of
K, used as a measure of the duration of growth (and inversely
related to the rate of growth);
# t0¼the point of maximum growth, used as a measure of the
timing of growth.
For industry level growth, we fitted logistic functions to the
full data period except for technologies with distinct, sequential
phases of growth (e.g., refineries). In these cases, logistic functions
were fitted to the 1st phase of growth to the extent that it
evidenced a clear plateau. For unit level growth, we fitted logistic
functions to data describing maximum unit capacities or the unit
scale frontier. We also used logistic functions to describe the
change in average unit capacities over a technology’s lifecycle,
although only indicatively as average capacities around the
asymptote tend to be highly variable (see Fig. 1) and so breach
the accuracy criterion. For full details of the logistic function
fitting, and its rationale, see (Wilson, 2009).
4. Results
We report findings that are broadly consistent across the
sample of eight energy technologies analysed. We organise our
findings in four sections. First, we characterise sequential phases
in unit level and industry level growth (Section 4.1) emphasising
the importance of an initial formative phase (Section 4.2). Second,
we explore the up-scaling phase and its timing (Section 4.3).
Third, we situate these unit level growth processes within the
overall pattern of industry level growth (Section 4.4). We were
particularly interested in the timing and duration of up-scaling at
the unit level in relation to the expansion of production in
industry level growth, as this could indicate the confounding of
cost reductions attributed to learning effects with those attributable
to unit scale economies.
Throughout, we present data and figures either globally or
from the core region (market of first commercial introduction);
however, all the findings discussed are consistent across different
regions. For full details, see footnote 4 and (Wilson 2009).
4.1. Sequential formative, up-scaling and growth phases
The upper panels of Fig. 2 show unit level and industry level
data for coal power through the 20th century. The left-hand graph
shows the number of steam turbine units built each year, along
with their average and maximum unit capacities. The right-hand
graph shows the total capacity added each year as well as the
cumulative total. Over the first 50 years of diffusion, slow growth
in cumulative total capacity was driven by unit numbers. Unit
capacities remained low, with maximum unit capacities typically
in the 10–50 MW range. During the next 20 years, continued
growth in cumulative total capacity was increasingly driven by a
concentrated period of up-scaling at the unit level, though unit
numbers also increased. Maximum unit capacities increased to
around 1000 MW; average unit capacities to around 250 MW. For
the next 30 years, unit capacities fluctuated around these levels,
but sustained growth in cumulative total capacity was again
driven by unit numbers.
This sequence within the overall diffusion pattern of coal
power through the 20th century can be summarised as:
(i) a ‘formative phase’ of many smaller-scale units with only
small increases in unit capacity;
(ii) an ‘up-scaling phase’ of large increases in unit capacities,
particularly at the scale frontier, concurrent with an increase
in numbers of units;
(iii) a ‘growth phase’ of large numbers of units at larger unit
capacities.
The lower panel of Fig. 2 clarifies this sequence by plotting unit
level and industry level growth on the same graph using logistic
functions (lines) fitted to the data (markers), with both indexed to
their corresponding saturation levels (shown in the box). This
indexing means that the timing and steepness (growth rate) of the
logistic functions are only meaningful relative to one another.
However, the timing of up-scaling between the formative and
growth phases is made very clear. Moreover, this basic sequence is
found in each of the energy technologies analysed, although the
timing and distinctiveness of the up-scaling phase varies.
The up-scaling phase of nuclear power, for example, occurred
closer to the beginning of commercial diffusion if compared to the
sequence for coal power shown in Fig. 2. The unique issues
associated with managing nuclear fuel cycles coupled with the
need to reduce capital costs drove rapid up-scaling from the mid-
1960s to mid-1970s following a relative short formative phase.
The build out of large capacity units continued until the late
1980s after which growth saturated.
Natural gas follows a similar pattern to coal, with units at the
scale frontier rising markedly in capacity in the 1950s and 1960s,
although in this case the growth in unit numbers was subsequent
to, rather than concurrent with, this up-scaling phase.
Up-scaling in US refineries was concentrated during the
several decades following World War II which is concurrent with
the growth phase of the industry in total capacity terms. Increases
in unit scale were largely saturated by the 1970s; industry-led
growth similarly plateaus following the oil shocks.
For jet aircraft, the unit scale frontier was largely saturated by
the introduction of the Boeing 747-100 in 1969 (see Fig. 1). This
5 The 3-parameter logistic function takes the form: y¼ K=ð1þe%b t2t0ð ÞÞ with
K¼asymptote, b¼rate, t0¼ inflection point of maximum growth at K/2 about
which the logistic function is symmetrical. (We also tested the Gompertz, Sharif–
Kabir and Floyd functions which relax the symmetry requirement of logistic
growth, but these were poorer fits to the data, see Wilson (2009) for details). The
derived Dt (delta t)¼ log 81/b which is the time period over which y grows from
10% to 90% of K (or from 1% to 50% or 50% to 99% of K). For further details, see
Marchetti and Nakicenovic (1979).
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took place during the first 10 years of a 50-year period of
continual growth in unit numbers.
By comparison, the successful commercialisation of modular
end-use technologies in the 20th century (represented by cars
and light bulbs in the sample analysed) has been associated with
mass production rather than up-scaling or unit level growth. The
average unit capacity of new cars grew from 7 kW to 140 kW over
the last 100 years; the average unit capacity of new compact
fluorescent light bulbs (CFLs) has held roughly constant at 15 W
(IEA, 2006). The initial emphasis on unit numbers as the main
driver of diffusion during the formative phase is therefore less
remarkable. The subsequent up-scaling phase during which unit
capacity increases (if at all) is less distinctive and more drawn out.
4.2. The formative phase: experimentation with many small-scale
units
In the sequence through formative, up-scaling, and growth
phases, wind power is an interesting case in that it combines clear
up-scaling at the unit level with the modularity more character-
istic of end-use technologies.
Fig. 3 compares unit level and industry level growth for wind
power in Denmark, its ‘core’ region of first commercial applica-
tion. The commercial history of new turbine models developed by
Vestas, the leading Danish (and global) manufacturer, is used as
an approximation of the unit scale frontier. The resulting up-
scaling of turbines is still far from saturation, particularly in the
Fig. 2. Unit level and industry level growth in coal power globally. Notes: Upper left panel shows unit level growth in terms of the maximum capacity (green), average
capacity (red), and numbers (blue) of additional units each year. Upper right panel shows industry level growth in terms of additional capacity each year (orange) and
cumulative total capacity (brown). Lower panel shows logistic functions fitted to these data and also cumulative numbers of units (blue). Each logistic function is indexed
to its respective asymptote; absolute asymptote values are shown in the box. Data from: Platts (2005); see Wilson (2009) for details. (For interpretation of the references to
colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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offshore segment for which 5 MW and larger unit capacities are
envisaged (GWEC, 2008).
Notable in Fig. 3 is the lengthy formative phase which
precedes the up-scaling phase. In the Danish wind case, this
was a period of experimentation and learning from the build out
of many units of a relatively small and fairly constant unit size
from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, a period extending well into
the full commercial application of the technology (Heymann, 1998).
Importantly, learning was facilitated by relationships between
industry actors supported by public investments in, for example,
testing infrastructure which meant experiences fed back into
subsequent designs (Garud and Karnoe, 2003). In contrast,
countries like Germany, Sweden, and Netherlands placed early
emphasis on rapidly increasing turbine capacities to capture unit
economies of scale. In Sweden, for example, early government R&D
emphasised up-scaling turbines to the 2–3 MW range in a context
of uncertain market demand (Astrand and Neij, 2006). This pre-
mature move to the up-scaling phase failed to build an enduring
industry (relative to the Danish case) (Meyer, 2007).
The importance of the formative phase as a precursor of efforts
to up-scale unit capacities is further illustrated in Table 2 which
compiles data for the five energy supply technologies in their core
regions (which vary geographically and in size). The right-hand
column shows the length and number of units built during a
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Fig. 3. Unit level and industry level growth in wind power in Denmark. Notes: Upper left panel shows unit level growth in terms of the maximum capacity (green), average
capacity (red), and numbers (blue) of additional units each year. Upper right panel shows industry level growth in terms of additional capacity each year (orange) and
cumulative total capacity (brown). Lower panel shows logistic functions fitted to these data and also cumulative numbers of units (blue). Each logistic function is indexed
to its respective asymptote; absolute asymptote values are shown in the box. Data from: Danish_Energy_Agency (2008). (For interpretation of the references to colour in
this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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formative phase which runs from first commercial application to
the point at which new units reach 10% of the eventual maximum
unit scale. This formative phase lasts decades, and sees the build
out of hundreds of units.
Nuclear power is the outlier with a relatively short formative
phase and relatively few numbers of units built prior to up-
scaling. The unit scale frontier of nuclear power increased five-
fold in the decade that followed commissioning of the first
50 MW commercial reactor in 1956. Ultimately, these rapid
increases in unit scale were a contributing factor to the rising
complexity that created diseconomies of scale and constrained
further growth of the industry in the late 1970s (Lovins et al.,
2003; Grubler, 2010).
The initial formative phase of industry level growth shown in
Table 2 describes the building out of large numbers of units over an
often extended period. During the formative phase, technologies are
repeatedly and iteratively tested, modified, refined, and adapted to
market demands (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). This process may
begin with demonstration plants or projects which are an ‘‘extension
of the prototyping process into the next phases of development’’
(Hendry et al., 2010) and are widely used to prove the viability of
scaling up small scale lab applications into commercial technologies
(Sagar and Gallagher, 2004). Current and recent historical examples
include carbon capture and storage (de Coninck et al., 2009), wind
power (Harborne and Hendry, 2009), and solar photovoltaics (Hendry
et al., 2010). Market niches with either price insensitive user
preferences or support from public policy then provide a subsequent
testing ground, protected from full commercial pressures.
But the length of formative phases shown in Table 2 suggests
that experimentation extends well into the commercial diffusion
phase of the technology’s lifecycle, and contributes to the knowl-
edge, technical skills, and institutional developments which
underpin subsequent increases in the unit scale of a technology.
Historical evidence suggests therefore that the formative phase is
a necessary precursor to the up-scaling phase.
4.3. The up-scaling phase: the timing of unit level growth relative to
industry growth
Fig. 4 compares the relative timing of up-scaling or unit level
growth within the overall industry level growth for all technol-
ogies for which data were available and described by logistic
functions (the figure legend shows the full sample). The left-hand
graph uses average unit capacities as a measure of unit level
growth; the right-hand graph shows maximum unit capacities.
Data points further to the right describe technologies for which
Fig. 4. Timing of unit level growth or up-scaling relative to industry level growth for different technologies in their core regions using available data. x-axes show period
between year of peak growth (t0) in unit capacity and year of peak growth in industry capacity. Left-hand graph shows average unit capacity; right-hand graph shows
maximum unit capacity. y-axes show duration of industry level growth.
Table 2
Formative phases of energy supply technologies. Formative phase runs from first commercial application to the point at which new units reach 10% of the eventual
maximum unit scale.
Technology Initial market First commercial units
installed
10% of Eventual maximum unit
scale reached
Formative phase: number of years
& number of units
Natural gas power OECD 1900s 1948 50 years, 4400 units
Coal power OECD 1900s 1950 50 years, 4775 units
Nuclear power OECD 1950s 1963 10 years, 25 units
(1940s)a
Wind power Denmark 1970s 1987 15–100 years, 41400 units
(1880s)a
Refineriesb US 1860s–1870s (1948—average capacity only) (80–90 years, 4500 units?)b
a First nuclear installations on submarines date to 1940s; first wind power generators date to 1880s, but from 1970s in their modern form.
b Refineries data are indicative only. Maximum unit scale approximated by average capacity additions; number of units are rough estimate.
C. Wilson / Energy Policy 50 (2012) 81–94 89
the rate of unit level growth peaks earlier than the rate of
industry level growth (e.g., jet aircraft); data points further to
the left describe technologies for which unit level growth peaks
concurrently with, or after the peak rate of industry level growth
(e.g., wind power). The y-axis plots the duration of that industry
level growth from relatively rapid diffusion with low Dt’s (e.g.,
nuclear power) to relatively slow diffusion with high Dt’s (e.g.,
refineries).
The number of data points in Fig. 4 are limited, and jet aircraft
is the only end-use technology represented (and an outlier on the
left-hand graph). With these caveats in mind, two general
patterns are observed. First, up-scaling peaks up to 20 years
before industry growth peaks (data points to the right of the x¼0
vertical axis). Second, up-scaling occurs earlier for technologies
with longer diffusion times (data points slope upwards from left
to right).
Fig. 5 shows logistic functions fitted to the time series data of
unit level growth in terms of both average unit capacity (left-
hand graph) and maximum unit capacity (right-hand graph). This
allows easier comparison between the timing and rate of up-
scaling between different technologies. As before, each logistic
function is indexed to its respective asymptote with absolute
values shown in the box. Average unit capacities in particular
vary widely around these saturation levels (see Fig. 1).
Immediately evident in Fig. 5 is the slow rate of unit level
growth for natural gas power. Jet aircraft and, to a lesser extent,
wind power, also grow relatively slowly at the unit level com-
pared to coal and nuclear power.
The up-scaling patterns shown in Figs. 4 and 5 are descriptive.
They do not directly indicate the mechanisms or drivers of up-
scaling. Yet the commonalities and differences between technol-
ogies allow certain inferences to be drawn in line with the
existing literature (reviewed earlier).
First, the up-scaling phase preceding the main industry growth
phase is consistent with the innovation literature on dominant
designs. The dominant design of a technology settles on a
particular set of key design concepts (Murmann and Frenken,
2006) and ensures the appeal of a technology beyond its initial
niche markets (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). Changes in unit
scale become part of what Frenken and Nuvolari (2004) describe
in evolutionary terms as a ‘‘growing variety and differentiation
into distinct design species’’ (p. 420). This emphasises the impor-
tant influence of different market segments or ‘‘application
domains’’ on the evolution of the technology. Diffusion through-
out these segments then comprises the main phase of industry
level growth measured in terms of cumulative total capacity as in
the analysis presented here.
Second, differences in the rates (and durations) of unit level
growth can be attributed to the push and pull of economies of
scale and market heterogeneity. Nelson and Winter (1977) noted
that the pursuit of economies of scale was a natural element in
many technologies’ development trajectories, with up-scaling a
common heuristic guiding innovation in the production of dur-
able equipment (Winter, 2008). Using civil aircraft as an empirical
case, Frenken and Leydesdorff (2000) found that up-scaling to
exploit unit level scale economies occurred once the fundamental
design issues had been settled, and a technology could then be
adapted to the needs of particular market segments. ‘Technology-
push’ drivers to drive down costs are thus tempered by and
situated within ‘market-pull’ drivers demanding technologies at
different, and potentially, larger unit scales. Slow growth in terms
of average unit capacity (left-hand graph, Fig. 5) indicates tech-
nologies with heterogeneous applications in diverse market seg-
ments. Rapid up-scaling in terms of maximum unit capacity
(right-hand graph) indicates technologies with strong unit scale
economies. In other words, the larger the difference between
rates of up-scaling described by maximum unit capacities (right-
hand graph) and average unit capacities (left-hand graph), the
stronger the countervailing influence of demand heterogeneity on
scale economies at the unit level.
The potential tension between these two drivers are played
out in the case of wind power as discussed above in the Danish
context, but more clearly with natural gas power for which scale
independence in terms of technical efficiency has meant its use in
applications spanning distributed units in the kW range up to
centralised combined cycle configurations in the 100s of MW or
even GW range (Lee, 1987). Natural gas power up-scales much
more rapidly in terms of maximum capacity (Dt¼29 years) than
Fig. 5. Unit level growth or up-scaling in energy technologies in their core regions. Logistic functions fitted to data on average unit capacities (left-hand graph) and
maximum unit capacities (right-hand graph). Each logistic function indexed to its respective asymptote; absolute asymptote values are shown in the box. For details, see
Wilson (2009).
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average capacity (Dt¼64 years), i.e., economies of scale but
heterogeneous applications. At the other extreme, nuclear power
up-scales rapidly in terms of both maximum (Dt¼11 years) and
average unit capacity (Dt¼18 years), i.e., strong economies of
scale with homogeneous applications.
An end-use technology like cars up-scales slowly in terms of
both maximum and average capacity, i.e., weak economies of
scale at the unit level and heterogeneous applications. The
demand context for each technology determines the appropriate-
ness of different unit scales and in general, market segments are
more heterogeneous for distributed end-use technologies than for
centralised energy supply technologies producing homogeneous
energy carriers (e.g., electricity, liquid fuel).
4.4. The growth phase: industry level growth and substitute
technologies
Fig. 6 compares the duration (Dt) of industry level growth
between technologies in terms of both cumulative total capacity
and cumulative total numbers of units. Technologies are ordered
from top to bottom by increasing average unit capacity.
Two patterns are evident from Fig. 6. First, the duration of
industry level growth is shorter in terms of cumulative total
capacity than cumulative total unit numbers. This again points to
the formative phase of early commercialisation during which unit
numbers are built out before unit capacities are up-scaled, so
extending the duration of diffusion in terms of unit numbers.
Second, the duration of industry level growth tends to be
shorter as technologies increase in unit capacity (bars get shorter
from top to bottom). Compact fluorescent light bulbs and wind
power are clear exceptions to this pattern, with relatively short
duration growth despite relatively small unit capacities. There are
various possible explanations. They are both less capital intensive
in $ per unit terms (not $ per MW), and have more recent
introduction dates into more globalised markets, potentially
accelerating knowledge transfer (‘spillover’) effects and driving a
faster increase in manufacturing capacity and market develop-
ment. A more probable explanation, however, is also the simplest:
compact fluorescent light bulbs and wind power are both direct
substitutes for incumbent technologies (Grubler et al., 1999). As a
result, the diffusion of these technologies required less concurrent
change in associated infrastructures and institutions (Rip and
Kemp, 1998). This ready substitution is markedly different from
the early coal, gas, and hydro-driven expansion of the electricity
system earlier in the 20th century.
5. Discussion
5.1. Implications for experience curve analyses
The timing of the up-scaling phase following the formative
phase and preceding the industry level growth phase supports the
argument that learning rates are sensitive to time periods
analysed (Nemet, 2006; Lindman and Soderholm, 2012). Experi-
ence curve analyses may be preferable on time series data
covering first commercial introduction through to maturity
(McNerney et al., 2011), though this is rarely the case. Experience
curve analyses which model the relationship between cumulative
production and cost during the up-scaling phase but not the
subsequent growth phase are more likely to overstate industry
level learning rates.
The conflation of production experience with up-scaling
effects as the source of observed unit cost reductions is more
likely for technologies with clear economies of scale at the unit
level and technologies servicing homogenous market demands.
Such technologies are characteristic of energy supply and con-
version, and particularly centralised electricity generation of an
almost perfectly substitutable product (Kalkuhl et al., 2012).
Centralised energy supply technologies (including nuclear power,
coal power, and refineries in the sample analysed) up-scale
rapidly in terms of both maximum and average unit capacities
earlier on in the overall growth of the industry, so at a time when
production experience and learning effects are also salient. Due to
the mismatch between large scale supply and distributed end
user demand, up-scaling or unit level growth is dependent on,
and has been enabled by, the concurrent scaling up of distribution
infrastructure (e.g., pipelines, tankers, grids) and associated insti-
tutions (e.g., wholesale and retail markets) (Grubler, 1990).
By comparison, modular end-use technologies service diverse
market demands and user preferences. Up-scaling of the unit size
of technologies is less marked, more drawn out, and less conflated
with the learning effects and scale economies associated with
production or manufacturing (including cars and CFLs in the
sample analysed).
5.2. Limitations
The findings of this analysis are first order. Their inherent
generality and the limited sample size means their application to
selected energy technologies, past or future, should be treated
with caution.
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Fig. 6. Duration of industry level growth for eight energy technologies in their
core regions. Duration of growth (Dt) in terms of cumulative total numbers of
units (blue bars) and cumulative total capacity (brown bars). Technologies are
ordered from top to bottom by increasing average unit capacity. (For interpreta-
tion of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the
web version of this article.)
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5.2.1. Limited sample size of selected technologies
Findings could be interpreted with greater confidence if more
data points are found to fit the observed patterns. Time series
data for eight technologies were analysed from an initial sample
of 11 (see Table 1). Technologies were selected based on:
(i) significant contribution to energy conversion and/or end-use
service provision; (ii) maturity of observed growth to allow
reliable logistic function fitting; and (iii) available data. A combi-
nation of (i) and (ii) meant the eight technologies sampled had
made a significant observed contribution to the energy system
historically through their widespread diffusion. This should not,
however, be interpreted as underwriting their future success.
Further data collection should extend the scope of energy tech-
nologies analysed, particularly end-use technologies. Examples
include piston aircraft, steamships, rolling stock, industrial
motors, and any number of household appliances (e.g., fridges,
microwaves, TVs). Inclusion of biofuel production (e.g., ethanol,
biodiesel) would extend the set of non-power energy supply
technologies.
Using capacity as a metric of scale fails to control for key
technology characteristics which vary between technologies.
These include capital stock turnover, conversion efficiencies, and
load factors. Further analysis should examine the effects of a
technology’s lifetime and efficiency on the timing and extent of
the up-scaling phase, relative to other technologies.
5.2.2. Generality
The eight technologies analysed moved through their respective
formative, up-scaling, and industry growth phases at different
times, over different geographies, and in different institutional
contexts. The findings presented and inferences drawn are there-
fore inherently general. Innovation studies make clear that the
drivers and mechanisms of – in this case – up-scaling will vary as a
function of institutional, infrastructural, and other differences
between innovation systems at different scales (Edquist and
Johnson, 1997; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). Local knowledge
and institutions are needed to develop, manufacture (or import),
adapt, install, and above all, use a new energy technology effec-
tively (Grubler et al., 2012).
At best, therefore, the inferences drawn offer an interpretation
of observed generalisable patterns whose interest lies precisely in
the commonalities found among very different energy technologies.
This is particularly marked spatially. The time series data presented
describe the growth patterns of energy technologies either globally
or in each technology’s respective ‘core’ region of first commercial
application. For the eight technologies analysed this includes: the
OECD (coal, nuclear, gas power), Denmark (wind power), the US
(refineries, cars), North American and Western Europe (aircraft,
CFLs). The findings presented also held for each technologies’
respective ‘rim’ and ‘periphery’ region, ranging from the former
Soviet Union to current day Africa.
6. Conclusions and policy implications
6.1. Summary of findings
Table 3 summarises the key findings of this analysis of unit
level and industry level growth on a sample of eight energy
technologies ranging from 10 GW-eq. oil refineries to 15 W
compact fluorescent light bulbs. In particular, an up-scaling phase
in which technologies increase rapidly in scale at the unit level is
found to follow an often extended formative phase and precede
the main growth phase of an industry. This has an important
implication for experience curve analyses which may conflate
unit scale effects with learning effects in the attribution of
observed unit cost reductions over time. The coincidence in time
of the up-scaling phase with learning processes is likely to be
particularly acute for centralised energy supply technologies with
clear economies of scale in homogeneous market segments.
Examples in the sample of technologies analysed include large-
scale power plants and refineries.
6.2. Implications for technology policy: a conceptual framework of
unit level and industry level growth
The commonalities shown in Table 3 for a range of energy
technologies also offer some insights for policies aiming to
support the diffusion of low carbon energy technologies.
Fig. 7 draws together the various factors found to have enabled
or influenced unit level growth in the context of industry level
growth. Each factor is illustrated by technologies both historically
as covered in the analysis (grey) and also suggestively in the
future in low carbon scenarios (grey italics).
These unit level enabling factors are broadly of two types:
# Characteristics specific to the technology: Returns to scale,
‘retrofitable’, modularity, and flexibility.
# Characteristics specific to the market or system into which the
technology diffuses: Expanding production, and complementary
technologies and institutions.
Table 3
Summary of findings on unit level and industry level growth in a sample of eight energy technologies.
Theme Section Empirical finding Example
technology
Sequential phases in unit level
and industry level growth
4.1 Industry scaling in capacity terms is driven first by unit numbers, then by unit
scaling, then again by unit numbers. This is described by the sequence
through a ‘formative phase’, an ‘up-scaling phase’ and a ‘growth phase’
Coal power
4.2 The formative phase lasts several decades, involving experimentation with
many small-scale units as a precursor to up-scaling
Wind
power
4.3 The midpoint of the up-scaling phase can occur up to 20 years before the
midpoint of the growth phase
Jet aircraft
Up-scaling 4.3 Rates of up-scaling are a trade-off between economies of scale and demand
heterogeneity across different market segments
Natural gas
power
Industry growth 4.4 Rates of industry level growth are more rapid for technologies with larger
unit capacities, and technologies that are ready substitutes for incumbents
Nuclear
power,
CFLs
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All these have been discussed in earlier sections with the
exception of ‘retrofitable’. This describes up-scaling through the
retrofitting of existing units rather than the building of new units,
and is a distinctive characteristic of process technologies such as
refineries.
Interpreted as potential levers for technology policy to exploit,
the enabling factors outlined in Fig. 7 comprise different ‘routes’
to the industry level growth of low carbon energy supply or
efficient end-use technologies. Depending on the characteristics
of the technology in question, policies can target unit numbers or
unit capacities. Policies to support scaling of unit numbers might
protect diverse market niches for small-scale distributed applica-
tions, or might diversify R&D investments for a technology across
multiple sectors and operating environments. Policies to support
scaling of unit capacity might co-fund demonstration projects and
field trials testing large-scale infrastructure, or might streamline
the licensing process for up-scaling retrofits.
Timing, however, is important. Up-scaling without sufficient
numbers of commercial ‘experiments’ (or small-scale applica-
tions) risks being premature, as in the Danish success in wind
power compared to other countries’ relative failures. This strikes a
cautionary note for policies acting too early in a technology’s
commercial lifecycle to support up-scaling, and similarly for
policies which presume rather than support the discovery of
returns to scale.
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